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We consider several distributed collaborative key agreement protocols for dy-
namic peer groups. There are several important characteristics which make 
this problem different from traditional secure group communication. They are 
(1) distributed nature in which there is no centralized key server, (2) collabora-
tive nature in which the group key is contributory (i.e., each group member will 
collaboratively contribute its part to the global group key), and (3) dynamic 
nature in which existing members may leave the group while new members may 
join. Instead of performing individual rekeying operations, i.e., recomputing 
the group key after every join or leave request, we discuss an interval-based 
approach of rekeying. We consider three interval-based distributed rekeying 
algorithms, or interval-based algorithms for short, for updating the group key: 
(1) the Rebuild algorithm, (2) the Batch algorithm, and (3) the Queue-batch al-
gorithm. Performance of these three interval-based algorithms under different 
stochastic settings, such as different join and leave probabilities, is analyzed. 
We show that the interval-based algorithms significantly outperform the indi-
vidual rekeying approach, and that the Queue-batch algorithm performs the 
best among the three interval-based algorithms. More important, the Queue-
batch algorithm has the intrinsic property of substantially reducing the com-
putation and communication workload in a highly dynamic environment. To 
further enhance our algorithms, we focus on their extensions in two aspects: 
authentication and implementation. We incorporated a member authentica-
tion mechanism into the algorithms and hence strengthened their security. We 
i 
also implemented the Secure Group Communication Library (SGCL) to realize 
the algorithms and to offer a programming interface to software developers for 
building their secure group-oriented applications. Our work provides a fun-
damental understanding about establishing a group key via a distributed and 
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With the emergence of many group-oriented distributed applications such as 
tele /video-conferencing and multi-player games, there is a need for security 
services to provide group-oriented communication privacy and data integrity. 
To provide this form of group communication privacy, it is paramount that 
members of the group can establish a common secret key for encrypting group 
communication data. To illustrate the utility of this type of application, con-
sider a group of people in a peer-to-peer or ad-hoc network having a closed 
and confidential meeting. Since they do not have a previously agreed upon 
common secret key, communication between group members is susceptible to 
eavesdropping. To solve the problem, we need a secure distributed group key 
agreement protocol so that people can establish and a common group key for 
secure and private communication. Note that this type of key agreement pro-
tocols is both distributed and contributory in nature: each member of the 
group contributes its part to the overall group key. 
It is important to point out that the type of distributed group key agree-
ment protocols we study is very different from more traditional centralized 
group key agreement protocols. Centralized protocols rely on a centralized 
key server to efficiently distribute the group key. An excellent body of work 
on centralized key distribution protocols exists in [14, 20, 26, 27]. In those 
approaches, group members are arranged in a logical key hierarchy known as 
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a key tree. Using the tree topology, it is easy to distribute the group key to 
members whenever there is any change in the group membership (e.g., a new 
member joins or an existing member leaves the group). For distributed key 
agreement protocols we consider, however, there is no centralized key server 
available. This arrangement is justified in many situations - e.g., in a peer-to-
peer or an ad-hoc network where centralized resources are not readily available. 
Moreover, an advantage of distributed protocols over the centralized protocols 
is the increase in system reliability, because the group key is generated in a 
shared and contributory fashion and there is no single-point-of-failure. 
For the special case of a communication group having only two members, 
these members can create a group key using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
protocol [5]. In the protocol, members X and Y use a cyclic group Q of order 
p and a generator a. They can generate their secret components ex and ey, 
respectively. Member X (resp,, Y) can compute its public key a^^ mod p 
(resp., a^^ mod p) and send it to Y (resp., X). Since both members know 
their own exponent, they can each raise the other party's public key to the 
exponent and produce a common group key, which is equal to mod p. 
Using this common group key, X and V can encrypt their data to prevent 
eavesdropping by intruders. 
In this dissertation, we consider a dynamic communication group in which 
members are located in a distributed fashion. We extend the Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange protocol to more than two members in the communication group. 
The membership of the communication group is dynamic so that members can 
leave and new members can join the group at any time. The contributions of 
our work are: 
• The key agreement protocol is distributed and there is no centralized key 
server. 
• The key agreement protocol is contributory - each member contributes 
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its part to the overall group key. 
• Instead of performing individual rekeying operations, we propose to use 
an interval-based approach to significantly reduce the computation and 
communication costs of maintaining the group key. This interval-based 
approach preserves rekeying efficiency in dynamic peer groups. 
• We propose three interval-based distributed rekeying algorithms, or interval-
based algorithms for short, and conduct performance evaluation, includ-
ing both analytical and simulation-based analysis, to illustrate their per-
formance merits. 
• We propose an authenticated group key agreement protocol and prove 
its security strengths. 
• We implemented the Secure Group Communication Library (SGCL) to 
realize the interval-based algorithms. The library provides a set of API 
functions tailored for the development of secure group-oriented applica-
tions. 
The balance of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we 
first discuss related work about centralized group key distribution, distributed 
group key agreement, authenticated group key agreement, as well as the im-
plementation experience concerning group key management. In Chapter 3, we 
provide the background of the Diffie-Hellman protocol. We then explain how it 
can be extended to the Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman protocol, the group 
key agreement protocol that accommodates more than two members in a dy-
namic peer group. In Chapter 4, we present three interval-based algorithms to 
reduce the computation and communication costs for maintaining the group 
key in a dynamic peer group. In Chapter 5, we conduct mathematical analysis 
to quantify the system performance according to the given performance metrics 
when the original Diffie-Hellman tree is completely balanced. We also report 
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several experiments that illustrate the system costs under dynamic joins and 
leaves using various system parameters (e.g., join and leave probabilities). In 
Chapter 6，we describe our proposed authenticated group key agreement proto-
col, known as the Authenticated Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman (A-TGDH) 
protocol, and provide arguments on whether it satisfies our security goals. In 
Chapter 7，we study the implementation details of SGCL and present exper-
iments that evaluate the performance of the interval-based algorithms under 
real network settings. Finally, in Chapter 8, we conclude the dissertation and 
propose future directions that enrich the research. 
Chapter 2 
Related Work 
In this chapter, we consider a number of group key management schemes pre-
viously developed to protect group communication. These schemes can be 
classified into two categories: centralized group key distribution and decentral-
ized group key agreement. In centralized group key distribution, a centralized 
key server is set up to generate and distribute group keys to all group mem-
bers. In decentralized group key agreement, however, all group members are 
involved in generating the group key and finally agree upon a common group 
key. To verify the identities of group members that participate in the key gen-
eration process, several decentralized group key agreement schemes are further 
extended to incorporate authentication and they are classified as authenticated 
group key agreement schemes. In the following, we review the research work 
about group key management in three areas: (1) centralized group key dis-
tribution, (2) decentralized group key agreement, and (3) authenticated key 
agreement, as well as the implementation experience regarding group key man-
agement. 
Centralized group key distribution, as mentioned above, requires a single 
centralized key server to generate and distribute keys to group members. In-
tuitively, the key server can set up a secure unicast channel with each group 
member and distribute newly generated keys through these channels. This 
method, however, is not scalable when the member pool is very large. To 
5 
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address this scalability issue, Wong et al. [27] and Wallner et al. [26] indepen-
dently proposed the key tree approach to achieve secure group communication. 
They suggested to associate keys in a hierarchical tree and perform rekeying 
at every join or leave event. Later, the authors in [14, 20, 29] introduced 
batch rekeying, meaning that the group key is renewed at regular intervals. 
Therefore, the key renewal procedure is independent of membership dynamics 
and thus becomes more efficient. In this dissertation, we apply the key tree 
approach and the batch rekeying concept to our proposed algorithms. 
Decentralized group key agreement requires the participation of all group 
members and therefore avoids the single-point-of-failure problem found in cen-
tralized key distribution. Its research is explored in [4, 24, 11, 12], in which 
the authors extended the Diffie-Hellman protocol [5] to support secure group 
communication in a peer-to-peer network. Burmester and Desmedt [4] pro-
posed a computation-efficient protocol at the expense of high communication 
overhead. Steiner et al. [24] developed Cliques, in which every member intro-
duces its key component into the result generated by its preceding member and 
passes the new result to its following member. Cliques is efficient in rekeying 
for leave or partition events, but imposes a high workload on the last member 
in the chain. Kim et al. [11] proposed the Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman 
(TGDH) to arrange keys in a tree structure. Every member only needs to 
hold the keys along its key path, implying that the rekeying workload is dis-
tributed to all members. The authors also suggested a variant of TGDH called 
STR which minimizes the communication overhead by trading off the com-
putational complexity [12]. All the above schemes are contributory, meaning 
that all group members contribute their own private piece of information to 
generate the group key. While the key renewal in [4] is independent of mem-
bership change, the rest of the schemes [24, 11，12] suggest to perform rekeying 
at single join, leave, merge or partition events. One of our research goals is to 
enhance TGDH to support rekeying involving a batch of join and leave events. 
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Rather than emphasizing the rekeying efficiency, authenticated group key 
agreement focuses on how to efficiently incorporate the certified key compo-
nents of group members into a group key and hence attain a high degree of 
security. The authors in [10, 2, 17] developed authenticated group key agree-
ment schemes based on the Burmester-Desmedt model, Cliques, and TGDH 
respectively. The one proposed in [17], called AGKA-G, is an extension of the 
two-party Giinther scheme [8] to the TGDH protocol. However, the AGKA-
G protocol has several drawbacks. First, the Giinther scheme, and hence 
AGKA-G, does not provide perfect forward secrecy. Besides, AGKA-G is not 
role-symmetric since sponsors perform more operations in the key generation 
and distribution. Furthermore, it is not completely contributory as sponsors 
provide more contribution than non-sponsors in the resulting group key. As 
described in Chapter 6, we propose an authenticated group key agreement 
protocol that resolves these problems and meanwhile achieves desired security 
properties. 
Up to now, there have not been many implementation projects that at-
tempt to put group key management schemes in practice. The most famous 
one is called Secure Spread [25,1], which implemented the centralized group key 
distribution protocol and a number of distributed group key agreement proto-
cols including the Burmester-Desmedt model, Cliques, TGDH, and STR. The 
project reflects the features of the group key management schemes under join, 
leave, merge, and partition events, and provides a set of function calls suitable 
for secure application development. In our research, we implemented a pro-
gramming library based on the interval-based approach and built applications 
with the library to demonstrate its strengths and effectiveness. 
To summarize, group key management is divided into two categories: cen-
tralized group key distribution and decentralized group key agreement, while 
the latter is further extended to authenticated group key agreement. Through 
the investigation of batch rekeying under a key tree and the Tree-Based Group 
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Diffie-Hellman protocol, we make several contributions: proposing an interval-
based approach to perform rekeying, designing an authentication mechanism 





In this chapter, we introduce the working principle of the Tree-Based Group 
Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) protocol [11]^  , which substantiates our proposed pro-
tocols discussed in later chapters. In the following explanation, we also bring 
out several terminologies that will be used throughout this dissertation. 
In TGDH, each member maintains a set of keys, which are arranged in a 
hierarchical binary tree. We assign a node ID v to every tree node. For a given 
node V, we associate a secret (or private) key Ky and a blinded (or public) key 
BKY. All arithmetic operations are performed in a cyclic group of prime order 
p with the generator a. Therefore, the blinded key of node v can be generated 
by 
BKy = Q；�mod p. (3.1) 
Each leaf node in the tree represents the individual secret and blinded keys 
of a group member, denoted by Mi. Every member holds all the secret keys 
along its key path starting from its associated leaf node up to the root node. 
Therefore, the secret key held by the root node is shared by all the members 
and is regarded as the group key. Fig. 3.1 illustrates a possible key tree with 
iThe journal version of this paper appeared in [13]. 
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six members Mi to Me, e.g., member Mi holds the keys at nodes 7, 3, 1, and 
0. The secret key at node 0 is the group key of this peer group. 
(if© 
Ml M2 M4 M5 
Figure 3.1: A possible key tree used in the Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman 
protocol. 
The node ID of the root node is set to 0. Each non-leaf node v consists 
of two child nodes, whose node IDs are given by 4- 1 and 2v + 2. Based 
on the Diffie-Hellman protocol [5], the secret key of a non-leaf node v can be 
generated by the secret key of one child node of v, and the blinded key of 
another child node of v. Mathematically, we have 
K, = 奸 1 严奸2 modp 
= (狀 2 , + 2 严 州 mod p 
= m o d p. (3.2) 
Unlike the keys at non-leaf nodes, the secret key at a leaf node is selected by 
its corresponding group member. The key selection can be achieved through 
a secure pseudo random number generator [23 . 
Since the blinded keys are publicly known, every member can compute the 
keys along its key path to the root node based on its individual secret key. To 
illustrate, consider the group in Fig. 3.1. Every member Mi generates its own 
secret key and all the secret keys along the path to the root node. For example, 
member Mi generates the secret key Kj and it can request the blinded key 
BIU from M2, BK4 from M3, and BK2 from either M^^M^ or MQ. Given 
Mi's secret key K7 and the blinded key BKs, Mi can generate the secret key 
K3 according to Eq. 3.2. Given the blinded key BK4 and the newly generated 
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secret key K^, Mi can generate the secret key Ki based on Eq. 3.2. Given 
the secret key Ki and the blinded key BK2, Mi can generate the secret key 
KQ at the root. From that point on, any communication in the group can be 
encrypted based on the secret key (or group key) KQ. 
To provide both backward confidentiality (i.e., joined members cannot ac-
cess previous communication data) and forward confidentiality (i.e., left mem-
bers cannot access future communication data), rekeying, which means renew-
ing the keys associated with the nodes of the key tree, is performed whenever 
there is any group membership change, including any new member joining or 
any existing member leaving the group. Let us first consider individual rekey-
ing, meaning that rekeying is conducted after every single join or leave event. 
Before the group membership is changed, a special member called the sponsor 
is elected, and the sponsor is responsible for updating the keys held by the new 
member (in the join case) or departed member (in the leave case). We use the 
convention that the rightmost member under the subtree rooted at the sibling 
of the join and leave nodes will take the sponsor role. Note that the existence 
of a sponsor does not violate the decentralized requirement of the group key 
generation since the sponsor does not add extra contribution to the group key. 
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the rekeying operation after a single leave. 
Fig. 3.2 illustrates a member leave event. Suppose that member M5 leaves 
the system. Node 11 is then promoted to node 5, and nodes 2 and 0 become 
renewed nodes, which are defined as the non-leaf nodes whose associated keys 
in the key tree are renewed. Also, member M4 becomes the sponsor. It needs 
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to renew the secret keys K2 and KQ, and broadcasts the blinded keys BK2 
and BK5 to all the members. Members Mi, M2, and M3, upon receiving the 
blinded key BK2, can compute the new group key KQ, Similarly, members MQ 
and M7, upon receiving BK5, can compute K2 and then the new group key 
Ko. 
Figure 3.3: Illustration of the rekeying operation after a single join. 
Fig. 3.3 illustrates a new member Mg that wishes to join the group. Mg 
has to first determine the insertion node under which Mg can be inserted. To 
add a node, say v' (or tree, say T') to the insertion node, a new node, say is 
first created. Then the subtree rooted at the insertion node becomes the left 
child of the node n', and the node v' (or the root node of the tree T') becomes 
the right child of the node n'. The node n, will replace the original location 
of the insertion node. The insertion node is either the rightmost shallowest 
position such that the join does not increase the tree height, or the root node 
if the tree is initially well balanced (in this case, the height of the resulting tree 
will be increased by 1). Fig. 3.3 illustrates this concept. The insertion node is 
node 5 and the sponsor is M4. Ms then broadcasts its blinded key BK12 upon 
insertion. Given BK12, M4 renews K5, K), and KQ, and then broadcasts the 
blinded keys BK^ and BK2 to all members in the group. After receiving the 
blinded keys from M4, all remaining members can rekey all the nodes along 
their key paths and obtain the new group key KQ. 
Based on the above leave and join events in Fig. 3.2 and 3.3, we find that 
we can reduce one rekeying operation if we can simply change the association 
of node 12 from M5 to Ms. Interval-based rekeying is thus proposed such that 
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rekeying is performed on a batch of join and leave requests so as to reduce 
the number of rekeying operations. Members carry out rekeying operations at 
regular rekeying intervals. In the following chapter, we describe the interval-




In this chapter, we present three interval-based distributed rekeying algo-
rithms, or interval-based algorithms for short. They are the Rebuild algorithm, 
the Batch algorithm, and the Queue-batch algorithm. The aim of interval-based 
rekeying is to maintain good rekeying performance which is independent of the 
dynamics of joins and leaves. The three interval-based algorithms are devel-
oped based on the following assumptions: 
• The key tree of TGDH is used as a foundation of all the algorithms. 
• Rekeying operations are carried out at the beginning of every rekeying 
interval. There exists a virtual queue holding all join and leave requests 
until the beginning of the next rekeying interval. 
• When a new member sends a join request, it also includes its individual 
blinded key. 
• For simplicity, all members know the existing key tree structure and they 
also know all the blinded keys within the tree. 
• To obtain the blinded keys of the renewed nodes, the key paths of the 
sponsors should contain those renewed nodes. Since the interval-based 
14 
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rekeying operations involve nodes lying on more than one key paths, more 
than one sponsors may be elected. Also, a renewed node may be rekeyed 
by more than one sponsor. Therefore, we assume that the sponsors can 
coordinate with one another such that the blinded keys of all the renewed 
nodes are broadcast only once. 
In the next three sections, we present the interval-based algorithms. We 
adopt the following notations in our description. Let T denote the existing key 
tree. Assume that L > 0 existing members = (Mj ,…，M[) wish to leave 
and J > 0 new members M^ = {M(, . . . , Afj) wish to join the group within 
a rekeying interval. 
4.1 Rebuild Algorithm 
The motivation for the Rebuild algorithm is to minimize the resulting tree 
height so that the rekeying operations for each group member can be reduced. 
At the beginning of every rekeying interval, we reconstruct the whole key tree 
with all existing members that remain in the communication group, together 
with the newly joining members. The resulting tree is a left-complete tree, 
where its leaf nodes have depths differed by at most one and those deeper leaf 
nodes are located at the leftmost positions. The pseudo-code of the Rebuild 
algorithm to be performed by every member is shown in Fig. 4.1. 
Fig. 4.2 shows the scenario where members M2, M5, and Mj wish to leave 
and a new member Ms wishes to join the communication group. Based on the 
algorithm, the resulting key tree consists of five members and has all non-leaf 
nodes renewed. Besides, the sponsors include all the five members. 
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Rebuild (T, M^', J, M\ L) 
1. obtain all members from T and store them in M ' ; 
2. remove the L leaving members in M�from M ' ; 
3. add the J new members in M^ to M ' ; 
4. create a new binary tree T' based on members in M' and set T = T'; 
5. elect all members to be sponsors; 
6. rekey the key nodes and broadcast the new blinded keys in T; 
Figure 4.1: Pseudo-code of the Rebuild algorithm. 
‘ ( i h " ( ^ M -
Ml� Ms� 
Figure 4.2: Example of the Rebuild algorithm. 
4.2 Batch Algorithm 
The Batch algorithm is based on the centralized approach in [14], which is 
now applied to a distributed system without a centralized key server and all 
members contribute to the composition of the group key. The pseudo-code of 
the Batch algorithm is given in Fig. 4.3. Notice that the sponsors may have to 
wait for the blinded keys on another key path in order to proceed upwards to 
rekey the nodes. Finally, all the members obtain the necessary blinded keys 
to compute the new group key KQ. 
The Batch algorithm is illustrated with two examples. In Fig. 4.4, we show 
the case where L > J > 0. Suppose M�,M5, and My leave and a new member 
Mg wishes to join. The following steps are carried out: (i) Mg broadcasts 
its join request, including its individual blinded key. (ii) The leaf node 6 
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Batch (T, M ^ J, M\ L) 
1. if (L = = 0) { /* pure join case */ 
2. create a new tree T' based on new members in 
3. either (a) add T' to the shallowest node of T (which need not be the leaf 
node) such that the merge will not increase the height of the result tree, or 
(b) add T' to the root node of T if the merge to any node of T will increase 
the tree height; 
4. } else { /* some existing members want to leave */ 
5. sort in an ascending order of the associated node IDs of the members 
and store the results in M �= . •. , 
6. if {L > J) { /* more members want to leave than join */ 
7. if (J > 0) 
8. replace the departed nodes of {M[‘\ .. • , mY) with J joined nodes; 
9. if (L - J > 0) { 
10. remove remaining L — J leaving leaf nodes from the parent node; 
11. promote the siblings of the leaving leaf nodes; 
12 } 
13 } else { /* more newly joining members than leaving members */ 
14. divide M^ into L subgroups G = { G i , … , G l ) such that the first J mod 
L subgroups {Gi, • • • , Gj mod L) contain [^J + 1 new members and the 
rest contain [^J new members; 
15. create L subtrees (T{, • • •，T丄〉for the subgroups G; 
16. replace the departed nodes of • • •,仏^/—“、with the roots of 




19. elect the members to be sponsors if (1) they are new members, or (2) the right-
most members of the subtrees rooted at the siblings of the departed nodes or 
replaced nodes in T; 
20. if(sponsor) /* responsibility of the sponsor */ 
21. rekey the key nodes and broadcast the new blinded keys; 
Figure 4.3: Pseudo-code of the Batch algorithm. 
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associated with M7 is replaced by the node of Ms, and the leaf nodes 8 and 
24 are removed. Nodes 7 and 23 are promoted to nodes 3 and 11，respectively, 
(iii) Ml, M4, Me, and Ms are elected to be the sponsors. Mi renews secret 
keys KI and IQ, and M4 renews K5, K2, and KQ. MI then broadcasts BKI, 
and M4 broadcasts BK5 and BK2. MQ and Mg, though having the sponsor 
role, do not need to broadcast any blinded keys as M4 has already broadcast 
this information, (iv) Finally, every member can compute the new group key 
based on the received blinded keys. 
'^K'' ^ y. Me '.M^ tsj/Me^ s, 
Figure 4.4: Example 1 of the Batch algorithm where L > J > 0. 
Fig. 4.5 illustrates the case where J > L > 0. Suppose Ms, Mg, and Mio 
join, and M2 and M7 leave. The rekeying process is: (i) Mg, Mg, and Mio 
broadcast their join requests together with their own individual blinded key. 
(ii) Mg and Mg form the subtree and Mio is the only member of T .^ The 
root of T( replaces node 6 and the root of T': replaces node 8. (iii) The sponsors 
are Mi, Me, Ms, Mg, and Mio. Ms and Mg first need to compute the secret 
key KQ, and either one of them computes and broadcasts the new blinded key 
BKQ. (iv) Ml (or Mio) renews K^ and KI and broadcasts BK3 and BKI. MQ 
renews K2 and broadcasts BK2. (v) Finally, all the members can compute the 
new group key KQ. 
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M4 M5 2 M5 1 
Figure 4.5: Example 2 of the Batch algorithm where J > L > 0. 
4.3 Queue-batch Algorithm 
We find that the previous approaches perform all rekeying steps at the begin-
ning of every rekeying interval. This results in a high processing load during 
the update instance and thereby delays the start of the secure group com-
munication. Thus, we propose a more effective algorithm which we call the 
Queue-batch algorithm. Its intuition is to reduce the rekeying load by pre-
processing the joining members in the virtual queue during the idle rekeying 
interval. 
The Queue-batch algorithm is divided into two phases, namely the Queue-
subtree phase and the Queue-merge phase. The first phase occurs whenever a 
new member joins the communication group during the rekeying interval. In 
this case, we append this new member in a temporary key tree T'• The second 
phase occurs at the beginning of every rekeying interval and we merge the 
temporary tree T' (which contains all newly joining members) to the existing 
key tree T. The pseudo-codes of the Queue-subtree phase and the Queue-merge 
phase are illustrated in Figs. 4.6 and 4.7. 
The Queue-batch algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 4.8, where members Ms, 
Mg, and Mio wish to join the communication group, while M2 and My wish 
to leave. Then the rekeying process is as follows: (i) In the Queue-subtree 
phase, the three new members Ms, Mg, and Mio first form a tree T'. Mio, in 
this case, is elected to be the sponsor, (ii) In the Queue-merge phase, the tree 
T' is added at the highest departed position, which is at node 6. Also, the 
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Queue-subtree {T') 
1. if (a new member joins) { 
2. if (T' = = NULL) / * no new members in T，*/ 
3. create a new tree T' with the only one new member; 
4. else { / * there are new members in T， * / 
5. find the insertion node; 
6. add the new member to T'; 
7. elect the rightmost member under the subtree rooted at the sibling of 
the joining node to be the sponsor; 
8. if(sponsor) / * responsib i l i ty of the sponsor * / 
9. rekey the key nodes and broadcast the new blinded keys to the group; 
10. } 
11. } 
Figure 4.6: Pseudo-code of the Queue-subtree phase. 
Queue-merge (T, T', M\ L) 
1. if (L = = 0) { / * there i s no leave * / 
2. add T' to either (a) the shallowest node (which need not be the leaf node) 
of T such that the merge will not increase the resulting tree height, or (b) 
the root node of T if the merge to any locations will increase the resulting 
tree height; 
3. } else { / * there are leaves * / 
4. add T' to the highest leave position of the key tree T; 
5. } 
6. elect members to be sponsors if they are (a) the rightmost members of the subtree 
rooted at the sibling nodes of the departed leaf nodes in T, or (b) they are the 
rightmost member of T'; 
7. if(sponsor) / * respons ib i l i ty of the sponsor * / 
8. rekey the key nodes and broadcast the new blinded keys to the group; 
Figure 4.7: Pseudo-code of the Queue-merge phase. 
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- \ 
M4 Ms M, Ms/ M8...M9 \ 
Figure 4.8: Example of the Queue-merge phase. 
blinded key of the root node of T', which is BKQ, is broadcast by MIQ. (iii) 
The sponsors Mi, Me, and Mio are elected. Mi renews the secret key Ki and 
broadcasts the blinded key BKi, Mq renews the secret key K2 and broadcasts 
the blinded key BK2. (iv) Finally, all members can compute the group key. 
Chapter 5 
Performance Evaluation 
This chapter covers the performance evaluation of the interval-based algo-
rithms, consisting of Rebuild, Batch, and Queue-batch, in two aspects: math-
ematical analysis and simulations. It is important to point out that we only 
measure the rekeying performance at the update instance occurring at the be-
ginning of each rekeying interval. Hence, for Queue-batch, we only consider 
the Queue-merge phase but not the Queue-subtree phase. The pre-processing 
steps in the latter do not influence the underlying communication which is 
protected with the current group key except that it introduces slight overhead 
of extra key exchange traffic. The measurement reflects the latency of gener-
ating the latest group key for data encryption in order to provide backward 
and forward confidentiality. 
In the following text, we describe a number of mathematical models and 
simulation-based experiments. We also study the performance of the algo-
rithms in terms of their computation and communication costs. At the end of 
this chapter, we discuss the implication brought by our evaluation findings. 
5.1 Mathematical Analysis 
In this section, we present the mathematical analysis of the three proposed 
algorithms. We consider two performance measures, namely: 
22 
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1. Number of exponentiation operations: This metric gives a measure of the 
computation load of all members in the communication group. 
2. Number of renewed nodes: A node is said to be renewed if it is a non-leaf 
node and its associated keys are renewed. This metric provides a measure 
on the communication cost since new blinded keys of the renewed nodes 
have to be broadcast to the whole group. 
For simplicity, we assume the following in the analysis: 
• The existing key tree is completely balanced prior to the interval-based 
rekeying event. 
• Each member has a homogeneous leave probability. 
• The computation of the blinded group key of the root node is counted 
in the blinded key computations. With this assumption, the number of 
blinded key computations simply equals the number of renewed nodes, 
provided that the blinded key of each renewed node is broadcast only 
once. 
For the mathematical analysis, let N be the number of members originally 
in the system, L (where 0 < L < A^ ) be the number of members that wish to 
leave the system, and J > 0 be the number of new members that want to join 
the communication group. Let T denote the existing tree which contains N 
members. The level of a node v \s I = [log2(f + 1)J, where v is the node ID, 
and the maximum level of T is h. Based on the first assumption, i.e., the key 
tree is initially balanced, we know that N = Also, let Kaig be the number 
of renewed nodes and Saig be the number of exponentiations for the particular 
algorithm alg. The performance measure Saig is composed of two parts: “ 
and S i^g, which respectively represent the number of exponentiations of calcu-
lating the secret keys (which is done by all members) and that of calculating 
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the blinded keys (which is done by sponsors only). We have 
a^lg = a^lg + a^lg- (5.1) 
Also, we know the number of blinded key computations is 
=兄 air (5.2) 
which is simply the mathematical interpretation of the last assumption. 
In the following analysis, we only focus on the number of secret key com-
putations Shg. 
5.1.1 Analysis of the Rebuild Algorithm 
Given N, L, and J, we can obtain the exact expressions for the two perfor-
mance measures 兄Rebuild and SRebuild- It is important to note that the derived 
expressions below are valid even if the existing key tree T is not completely 
balanced originally. 
The resulting number of members is N* = N — L + J > 0. Thus, the 
number of renewed nodes (i.e. the number of non-leaf nodes) is 
… ‘ 0 if N* = 0, … 
nRebuiid{N*) = (5.3) 
I A'^ * - 1 otherwise. 
For SRebuiid{N*), we find that when TV* < 1, Sr—uAN” = 0. If IT e 
(2"'—1’ 2"'] for h' > 1 where h' = Llog2(7V* — 1)J + 1, we have 
^Rebuiidi^*) — (number of members at level h') x h' + 
(number of members at level h' — 1) x (h' — 1) 
=2(A/"-2Li�g2(�*-i)�)([k)g2(A^* — 1)J + 1) + 
(7V*-2(Ar-2Li�g2(f-i)」））|_log2(iV* - 1)J 
=N*l log2(N* — 1)J + 2N* - 2 � � … ( 5 . 4 ) 
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5.1.2 Analysis of the Batch Algorithm 
In analyzing the performance of the Batch algorithm, we consider the following 
five cases. Note that when L > 0, the performance metrics will depend on the 
membership leave positions and exact metrics cannot be obtained. Therefore, 
whenever L > 0 (e.g., cases 2 to 5 below), we derive the expected performance 
measures. We also define Tlaig.c and Saig,c be the two performance measures 
under condition c. We adopt the convention that the combination (") equals 
0 if n < 0, r < 0 or n < r. (The following analysis is the extension of the 
centralized case in [14] to the distributed case.) 
Case 1: J > L = 0 (pure join). Since the original key tree T is completely 
balanced before the rekeying operations, the subtree T' of the newly joined 
members will be inserted at the root of the existing tree T. Thus, the number 
of renewed nodes is 
兄Batch,J>L=Q =兄Rebuild�J) + 1 = (J _ 1) + 1 = J. (5.5) 
The first term corresponds to the number of renewed nodes for all new 
members and the last term is to account for the node renewal cost to the root 
node in the resulting tree T. 
The number of secret key exponentiations for the Batch algorithm is 
Sktck,J�L=0 = ^kbuilAJ) + + J)' (5.6) 
The first term corresponds to the exponentiation cost of creating a tree for 
the J new members. The term [N + J) is the secret key computations of the 
new root node in the resulting tree performed by the N J members. 
Case 2: L > J = 0 (pure leave). Consider a node v at level I. In a 
completely balanced tree, the node v has N/2^ descendants. When L > 0, the 
node V can be in one of the three different states at the rekeying instances: 
no-change, pruned, and renewed. The node v can be in the "no-change" state 
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if none of its iV/2' descendants wish to leave. The probability of being in the 
no-change state is 
尸[node V is no-change] = 乂 # ) . (5.7) 
(zJ 
The node v is pruned if (1) all descendants of the node v leave, and (2) 
all descendants of either its left or right subtree leave. In the latter case, v is 
pruned due to node promotion (please refer to step 11 of the pseudo code of 
the Batch algorithm). The number of non-leaf nodes that are pruned due to 
the node promotion is L (or L - 1 if all members leave). Thus, the expected 
number of renewed nodes can be expressed as 
‘ 1 � (N-N/2I�-
Et'o 2' 1 - � 而） - L ii L < N 
E[JlBatch,L>J=Q] = < L i^ iJ � (5.8) 
0 ii L 二 N. 
V 
To calculate the expected number of secret key computations, we first de-
rive the probability of renewing a node in terms of the number of departed 
descendants. When there is no node promotion, the node v is renewed if at 
least one but not all descendants of v leave the communication group. With 
node promotion, we have to exclude the counting of the renewed nodes that 
are pruned due to the departure of all descendants of their left or right subtree. 
The probability is thus given by 
P[node ” is renewed] = ；^ ( ^ ) ( “ ) - 2 J ] ^ ^ 八 广 ； 广 
i=l \L) i=0 VL/ 
yv/2'_i 命 -1 
= X ； Pi{i) - 2 ^ P2W, (5.9) 
i=l i=0 
where pi{i) is the probability that i members under the node v leave and p 2 � 
is the probability that all descendants under the left (or right) subtree of the 
node V leave and i members under the right (or left) subtree of the node v 
leave. 
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Let My{l) be the expected number of members involved in the secret key 
computations of the node v. By considering how many members remain under 
the node v, the expected number of secret key computations is thus equal to 
h-l 
matcM>J=o] = T/MM (5.10) 
1=0 
where My{l) is given by 
" / 2 ' - i � / v 1 和 i � / V 1 
= Y1 仍 ⑷ — 2 E 仍⑷. (5-11) 
i=l ‘“ J i=0 L "I 
Case 3: J = L > Q. Consider again a node v at level I. The probability 
that the node v will be renewed is given by 
P[node V is renewed] = 1 — P[no member under node v leaves 
Thus, the expected number of renewed nodes is 
h-l _ ^N-N/2'y 
•^l^Batch,J=L>o] = ^ 2' 1 ^ ~ • (5.13) 
Similar to case 2 above, let us consider the expected number of members 
that compute the secret key of node v at level I, which is 
My {I) = ^ P[i members under node v leave] [N/2'' 
= I • (5.14) 
The expected total number of secret key computations is given by 
h-l h-l「 /N-N/2'\‘ 
match,J=L>o] = = n Y , 1 — S V ^ • (5-15) 
/=0 1=0 L VL/ _ 
Case 4: J > L > 0. In this case, the L leaving leaf nodes are replaced by 
the roots of the subtrees T/'s consisting of J new members, where 1 < i < L, 
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Also, these subtrees will introduce an extra J - L renewed nodes. Using the 
result in case 3, the expected number of renewed nodes is 
E[nBatch,j>L>o] = 1 - � �J + ( J - L ) . (5.16) 
1=0 L VL/ . 
Among the L subtrees, the first J mod L subtrees consist of 旧 + 1 new 
members and require 备 — + 1) secret key computations, and the rest 
require 」）secret key computations. Let J' = L. The expected 
number of secret key computations is 
^[^Batch,J>L>o] = Batch,J'=L>o] + (J mod LfJ + 工) 
+(L - J mod LKLbuiJL^」）-Lh + Jh. (5.17) 
Note that the second to the last term is to subtract the secret key computa-
tions of the leaf node which is now replaced by the root node of the L subtrees. 
The last term refers to the extra computations required by new members to 
obtain the keys along the key path of the original tree T. 
Case 5: L > J > 0. In this case, we assume that the J newly joining 
members will randomly select L leaving leaf nodes for replacement as those 
leave positions are at the same level h. Using similar arguments as in case 2, 
since the actual number of pruned nodes is L — J, the expected number of 
renewed nodes is 
h-l � /N-N/2^\‘ 
El7ZBatch,L>J>o] = -(L-J)- (5.18) 
1=0 L VL； . 
Similar to the analysis in case 2, the probability of a node v being renewed 
at level I is equal to the probability of the node v considered to be renewed 
when no node promotion is performed, subtracting the probability of the node 
V considered to be renewed without node promotion but pruned with node 
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promotion. These two probabilities, denoted respectively pi and p2，are 
Pi = P[node V is renewed when no node promotion 
N/2'' . . 
— p 'k members under" ^ p 'k — i members join" 
L Lnode V leave � Lunder node v . 1=0 k=i 
_ p "no member under" ^ p "no member joins" 
Lnode V leave � Lunder node v -
Ar/2'-l N/2' / /Ar/2'\ {N-N/2^\ ( k \( L-k \ \ /N-N/2^\ 
_ V^ I k )\ L-k ) \k-i)\J-k+i) — V L J 
i=0 K=i \ \LJ \JJ / \LJ 
N/2'-l /N-N/2'\ 
= E 倘 
Z=0 \LJ 
N/2^ ( N-L \ ( J \ (L-J\ 
wher” ' i (0 = E ( " Z 2 L 化 八 - J . (5.19) 
k=i U/2'j 
P2 = renewed node v is pruned due to node promotion 
TV N �all members under the left"] fk — i members' 
2/-fl —上 2' + 1 
— 2 ^ p (or right) subtree leave and k 尸 join under the 
^ ^ 乙. members under the right (or right (or left) 
Lleft) subtree leave � Lsubtree -
— � 乙 乙 p i p i 
i=0 k=:i \L) \J) 
N 1 
= 2； ^ 想 
z=0 
, W.N \ M乙一左一iZTT^ \k-i) \ j-k+i ) (r on\ 
where 巧 � = JL\ . (5-20) 
Thus, the probability that the node v is renewed is 
尸[node V is renewed] = Pi - P2. (5.21) 
Hence, the expected number of secret key computations is given by 
h-l 
MATCH,L>J>0] = ⑴ ， （ 5 . 2 2 ) 
1=0 
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where My{l) is given by 
券-i/ZV � N (叩、 命 - 1 , N \ 
= - — J - W 0 义⑷.（5.23) 
z^ O \ L / i=0 
5.1.3 Analysis of the Queue-batch Algorithm 
The main idea of the Queue-batch algorithm exploits the idle rekeying interval 
to pre-process some rekeying operations. When we compare its performance 
with the Rebuild or Batch algorithms, we only need to consider the rekeying 
operations occurring at the beginning of every rekeying interval. 
When J = 0, Queue-batch is equivalent to Batch in the pure leave scenario. 
For J > 0，the number of renewed nodes in Queue-batch during the Queue-
merge phase is equivalent to that of Batch when J = 1. Thus, the expected 
number of renewed nodes is 
1 if J > 0, L = 0 
聊 腦 = E 二 2 [1 - ^ 丨 - L if J = 0 ， � 0 ( 5 . 2 4 ) 
, 1 「 (N-N/2I�-
Et"o 2' - ( ^ - 1 ) if J > 0 , L > 0 . 
\ L • 
Also, the expected number of exponentiations when J > 0 for Queue-batch 
is given by 
‘N + J i f j � 0 , L = 0 
E[SQueue-batch] = E[SBatch,L>J=o] if J = 0’ L > 0 (5.25) 
E[6^Batch,J=l and L>o] — d + dJ if J > 0, L > 0. 
\ 
For J > 0 and L > 0, assume the new subtree is attached to a node at some 
level d. We first decrement d from E[SBatch,j=i and l>o] to exclude the secret 
key computations of the leaf node which is now replaced by the root node of 
the new subtree. We then add dJ to account for the secret key computations 
done by these new J members. 
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The value d is the level of the highest node that has all its descendants 
departed. Instead of computing the expected value of d, we can find an up-
per bound value for oJ, which occurs when the leaving leaf nodes are evenly 
distributed in the key tree. Thus, d is given by 
f llogofA^-L)! + 1 ii N > L 
d = � L 纪、 厂 （5.26) 
0 N 二 L. 
� 
5.2 Experiments 
In the previous section, we quantified the performance measures by assuming 
that the existing tree is completely balanced. In this section, we perform a more 
elaborate performance study by investigating the costs of exponentiations and 
renewed nodes of the three proposed algorithms under different experimental 
settings. Besides, we also consider how many rounds the members take to 
generate the group key using different algorithms. 
In the experiments, we assume a finite population of size 1024, among 
which 512 are originally in the communication group at the beginning of each 
experiment. We also assume that potential members outside the group have a 
tendency to join the group with the same join probability. Similarly, members 
within the group have a fixed leave probability of leaving the group. We let 
PJ and PL denote the join and leave probabilities, respectively. 
Experiment 1: (Comparison between individual rekeying and 
interval-based rekeying algorithms) We first demonstrate through sim-
ulations that interval-based rekeying outperforms individual rekeying. Given 
a number of join and leave requests, the individual rekeying approach first 
processes one by one the join requests followed by the leave requests. We ran 
the simulations over 300 rekeying intervals. Then we discarded the results 
of the first 50 rekeying intervals to avoid transient discrepancies. Finally we 
computed the average results of the remaining intervals. 
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Figs. 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3^ illustrate the performance measures under different 
join and leave probabilities. These figures show that the three interval-based 
rekeying algorithms perform much better than the individual rekeying method. 
The advantage is even more prominent under high join and high leave prob-
abilities. This implies that the interval-based rekeying algorithms can reduce 
the computation and communication costs of the a group is highly dynamic. 
Experiment 2: (Evaluation based on mathematical models) This 
experiment evaluates the metrics of the three interval-based algorithms based 
on the mathematical models presented in the previous section. We started 
with a well-balanced key tree involving 512 members and then obtained the 
metrics under different values of joins and leaves (i.e., J and L). 
Fig. 5.4 illustrates the average number of exponentiations and the average 
number of renewed nodes under different numbers of joining and leaving mem-
bers. From these figures, we observe that Queue-batch outperforms the other 
two interval-based algorithms in all cases and there is a significant computa-
tion /communication reduction when the peer group is very dynamic (i.e., high 
number of members that wish to join or leave the communication group). 
Besides, we observe from Fig. 5.4 that the metrics of Batch and Queue-
batch exhibit a left-skewed bell-shaped pattern. To explain this behavior, we 
notice that at the beginning, the number of renewed nodes increases with the 
number of leaves and hence members have to rekey more nodes. However, as 
the number of leaves keeps increasing, the tree depth diminishes and members 
can take fewer rekeying steps to compute the group key. It is shown that the 
reduction of the tree depth begins to dominate the effect of the increase in the 
number of leaves when the number of leaves is around 100 to 200. 
Experiment 3: (Average analysis at different fixed join probabil-
ities) The previous experiment studies the case where the original tree is a 
balanced key tree. In this experiment, we further examine the case when the 
1 Because of the large size of the figures, we present them at the end of this chapter. 
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key tree becomes unbalanced after many intervals of join and leave events. We 
varied the join probability p j to be 0.25，0.5, and 0.75, and then evaluated 
the average performance measures of the three algorithms under various leave 
probabilities. 
The results are illustrated in Fig. 5.5. We observe that Queue-batch out-
performs the other two algorithms in terms of the costs of exponentiation and 
renewed nodes in most cases. The exception is that Queue-batch needs more 
exponentiations than Batch when the leave probability is low (smaller than 
0.2). The reason is that attaching the subtree of new members to an exist-
ing tree with few leaves may make the key tree unbalanced, leading to more 
computations in subsequent rekeying intervals. Moreover, the performance of 
Rebuild is the worst when pi is low, but approaches that of Batch when pi 
is high (e.g., both algorithms have similar average numbers of exponentiations 
and renewed nodes when pi is higher than 0.6 and 0.8, respectively). In most 
situations, Queue-batch outperforms the other two algorithms at different join 
and leave probabilities. This shows that the pre-processing of the join requests 
in Queue-batch can significantly reduce the computation and communication 
loads at the rekeying intervals. 
Experiment 4: (Instantaneous analysis at different join and leave 
probabilities) This experiment compares the instantaneous performance mea-
sures of Batch and Queue-batch over 300 rekeying intervals (we ignore Rebuild 
because it performs the worst among the three algorithms). We consider the 
cases with different values of p j and pi to represent different mobility char-
acteristics of the peer group. In this experiment, we recorded the metrics at 
each rekeying interval. 
Fig. 5.6 illustrates the instantaneous number of exponentiations at differ-
ent values of pj and pi. It is interesting to note that when the group has 
a moderate to high leave probability, then Queue-batch significantly outper-
forms the Batch algorithm. Fig. 5.7 illustrates the instantaneous number of 
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renewed nodes. Queue-batch has a much lower cost in renewing nodes, as 
compared to the Batch algorithm. This implies that Queue-batch can reduce 
the communication cost significantly. 
Experiment 5: (Performance analysis of Queue-batch with differ-
ent reset intervals) Queue-batch does not reconstruct the whole key tree as 
Rebuild during the rekeying. Thus the key tree may become unbalanced after 
some rekeying intervals. In this experiment, we consider how Queue-batch 
performs if we reconstruct the key tree using the Rebuild algorithm every TR 
rekeying intervals, where TR is called the reset interval This approach keeps 
the tree balanced at the cost of executing the Rebuild algorithm. We fixed p j 
=0 .5 and pi 二 0.25，0.5, and 0.75, and ran the simulations over 1000 rekeying 
intervals. Fig. 5.8 illustrates that the performance of Queue-batch remains ap-
proximately constant even at high reset intervals, meaning that Queue-batch 
can still preserve its performance without reconstructing the key tree after a 
long period of rekeying. This shows the robustness of the Queue-batch algo-
rithm in maintaining a relatively balanced tree. This property is important 
because it can reduce the average costs of exponentiations and renewed nodes 
in the system. 
Experiment 6: (Analysis in terms of number of rounds) In this 
experiment, we investigate the number of "rounds" required for the members 
to obtain the group key using different rekeying algorithms. We define one 
round as the period during which the group members can compute the secret 
keys as far up the key tree as they can. At the end of each round, all spon-
sors have to broadcast the blinded keys of the renewed nodes that have their 
secret keys computed so that other members can proceed with the secret key 
computations. In the analysis, we assume that rekeying is performed in lock-
step, meaning that the two steps of secret key computations and blinded key 
broadcasts do not occur coincidentally. 
Fig. 5.9 illustrates the results in both the average and instantaneous cases. 
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At high leave probabilities, Queue-batch saves 3 to 4 rounds as compared to 
Rebuild and Batch. The savings are due to the preprocessing of join requests 
at the Queue-subtree stage. A fewer number of rounds is preferred as less mes-
sage overhead is involved in processing rekeying messages and storing message 
headers. 
5.3 Discussion of the experimental results 
The above experiments show that under the stochastic settings, the interval-
based algorithms offer better computation and communication performance 
than the individual rekeying approach and Queue-batch is the best among the 
three interval-based algorithms. The superior performance of Queue-batch is 
more obvious when the occurrences of join and leave events are highly frequent, 
and the reason is explained below. Moreover, Queue-batch demonstrates its 
robustness in keeping the key tree balanced and its capability in minimizing 
the number of rounds required. 
To understand why Queue-batch outperforms more than the other two 
algorithms when the group is highly dynamic, we consider two cases: frequent 
joins and frequent leaves. When the number of join events is high, Queue-batch 
gains substantial performance advantages via the pre-processing of the join 
events in the Queue-subtree phase. Besides, when the number of leave events 
is high, Queue-batch reduces the depths of the existing tree nodes through node 
pruning. Batch, however, replaces the leaving leaf nodes with the joining ones 
and preserves the depths of the tree nodes. It implies Queue-batch requires 
fewer rekeying steps for the members whose associated leaf nodes are promoted 
to shallow positions. In combining two cases, Queue-batch can receive higher 
performance gains benefited from the frequent membership events. 
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batch. 
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The Diffie-Hellman protocol [5], which is the basic protocol for constructing 
TGDH, is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack. To resolve the problem, 
we incorporate an authentication step into the Diffie-Hellman protocol. One 
simple approach is to require both parties to sign and certify their blinded 
keys; i.e., members exchange with each other a key message containing {BK, 
sign{BK)}, where sign{') is the signature function to be applied to the blinded 
key BK. We may assume that both parties have already acquired the certifi-
cate of the other member from a trusted certificate authority (CA) to verify 
the signatures. The simple approach, however, incurs high computation cost 
in verifying signatures. More important, it is vulnerable to the substitution 
attack [6], meaning that an intruder may substitute its own signature for the 
signature of the other member. 
To provide authentication in group key agreement, we devise an Authen-
ticated Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman (A-TGDH) protocol. Our protocol 
extends the two-party authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol proposed in [21], 
and our authentication protocol has the following security properties: (i) key 
authentication (i.e., all group members are assured that no outsiders can ac-
cess the group key), (ii) key confirmation (i.e. all group members are assured 
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that they all possess the same group key), (iii) known-key security (i.e., the 
compromise of past short-term keys does not undermine the secrecy of fu-
ture short-term keys), and (iv) perfect forward secrecy (i.e., the compromise 
of long-term keys does not undermine the secrecy of past short-term keys). 
Each member holds two types of keys: short-term secret and blinded keys, as 
well as long-term private and public keys} Short-term keys (or session keys) 
are randomly generated when a member joins the group and becomes expired 
when the member leaves, while long-term keys (or permanent keys) remain 
static across many sessions and are certified by a trusted CA. Property (i) by 
itself provides implicit key authentication. If both properties (i) and (ii) are 
satisfied, the group key agreement scheme achieves explicit key authentication. 
6.1 Description of A-TGDH 
In the following description, we adopt several notations. As stated in Chap-
ter 6，every node v in the key tree is associated with a secret key Ky and a 
blinded key BKy. We then construct the blinded key set BK'们 which, in gen-
eral, refers to a number of copies BK:s respectively encrypted by the long-
term private component of every descendant group member of node v (the 
mathematical formulation of BK'^ is presented below). The set of the descen-
dant members of node v is given by My. The ith member, Mi, holds a short-
term secret key VMi and the corresponding blinded key a^ ^^  mod p, as well as 
a long-term private key XMi and the corresponding public key a®吟 mod p. 
For simplicity, we assume that all group members acquire each other's 
certificates and hence long-term public keys from a trusted CA before the key 
agreement process starts. Otherwise, the process should include the steps of 
exchanging the certificates. 
iTo distinguish between short-term and long-term key pairs, we use "secret key" and 
"blinded key" to represent short-term keys and the keys associated with the tree nodes, as 
well as "private key" and "public key" to refer to long-term keys. 
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We first review the two-party AK protocol given in [21]. Our presentation is 
based on the cyclic group of prime order p with generator a. Given two parties, 
say Ml and M2, the AK protocol works as follows (all arithmetic operations 
are to be performed mod p, although the convention is omitted for brevity): 
Ml sends to M2 and M2 sends a”购 to Mi. Mi computes . 
( a … 2 广 似 = Q,rMirM2+rMiXM2+rM2XMi _ Analogous operations are performed 
by M2. The agreed session key is then given hy K = _ 
The AK protocol offers a number of advantages. It involves only two passes 
and thus saves communication cost. It achieves key authentication and known-
key security [21]. If it is incorporated with key confirmation, it gives perfect 
forward secrecy as well [3 . 
We next extend the two-party AK protocol to our proposed A-TGDH pro-
tocol. In A-TGDH, we associate a node v with Ky and BK^ as follows: 
• If node V is a non-leaf node (with child nodes 2v 1 and 2v + 2): 
Ky = Q：於 mod p, 
where k = 奸2 + I<2v+i 冗恥 + 冗2奸2 X〕冗恥 ( 6 . 1 ) 
MiizlVl 2V+2 MieMsv + l 
二 ttherig 減 Id 
, , if node v is the root node undenned .. … . � (i.e. = 0) 
(6.2) 
• If node V is a, leaf node (associated with member Mi): 
Ky = Tm, (6.3) 
BK'^ = c/Mi mod p. (6.4) 
Thus, if a given node v needs to be renewed, a sponsor can simply broadcast 
BK'y according to one of our interval-based rekeying algorithms. Also, any 
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member can still include its short-term blinded key (i.e., the blinded key of its 
corresponding leaf node) in its join request. 
To achieve key confirmation, each member can broadcast the one-way func-
tion result of the group key after it is generated. However, this involves 0{N) 
broadcasts, where N is the number of members in the group, and this may be 
impractical. In an alternative approach given in [10], each member only needs 
to demonstrate its knowledge of the group key to its neighbors, provided that 
all the members are arranged in a linear chain. However, such an approach 
is vulnerable to the collusion attack [10]. To avoid the collusion attack prob-
lem, we propose the following. We divide a group into subgroups, such that 
members only confirm (via broadcasts) the group key with others within the 
same subgroup. The subgroups can be disjoint or intersected. The subgroup 
size and the number of subgroups are chosen depending on the desired level of 
security. 
To illustrate how A-TGDH works, we consider a possible key tree formed 
after the rekeying process as shown in Fig. 6.1. Nodes 0, 1, and 2 are renewed 
nodes. Also, Mi and M3 are chosen to be the sponsors. Hence, the members 
perform the following steps (key confirmation is ignored): 
© 0 © © 
Mi(s) M2 M3(s) M4 
Figure 6.1: Example of authenticated key agreement involving 4 members. 
• Since the blinded keys of leaf nodes are c / �f o r i 二 1，2, 3, and 4, the 
secret keys of nodes 1 and 2 are computed as 
j^l _ (Y^Mi TM2 XM2 MI 
K) — (y^M^^rM^+rM^XM^+rM^XM^ ^ 
Chapter 6 Authenticated Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman 47 
• The sponsor Mi broadcasts a如似3 and o；似财4，and the sponsor M3 
broadcasts a 如 “ i and a 尺 2 : c m 2 . 
• Ml and M2 can retrieve a^^ from and ，respectively. Simi-
larly, M3 and M4 can retrieve . Therefore, the members can compute 
the resulting group key, i^ 。，as 
= ^2 + Ki {XM^ +XM4) + K2 {XMi +XM2 ) 
A-TGDH acquires a higher degree of security at the expense of involving 
more key exchanges and key computations. The trade-off study between se-
curity and performance is a classic problem and the right answer varies from 
applications. However, we point out that secure applications should include 
authentication in all situations since the man-in-the-middle attack can bring 
catastrophic consequences. Authentication can be achieved through either au-
thenticated key agreement protocols such as A-TGDH or non-authenticated 
key agreement protocols that are protected with digital signatures. 
6.2 Security Analysis 
We argue that A-TGDH satisfies our stated security goals. We assume the 
existence of an active adversary E, which can inject, modify, and delete mes-
sages transferred between group members. The following arguments are mainly 
based on the Diffie-Hellman problem [5], i.e., given the elements a, p, a^ mod 
p, and dp mod p, it is computationally infeasible to obtain a卯 mod p without 
knowing both x and y. 
Theorem: A-TGDH satisfies key authentication, key confirmation, known-key 
security and perfect forward secrecy. 
Proof: We show that the protocol satisfies the following security properties: 
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1) Key authentication. Suppose E replaces 吟 with , for all pos-
sible public components involving node v and member Mi. In this case, a 
legitimate member 风 will compute the secret key of some node v � a s K y �= 
Ec . (assuming that Mi holds the secret component 
where Ec is the product of the public components obtainable by E. However, it 
is known to be computationally infeasible for E to obtain Ky�without know-
ing K2V0+1 and XMi (this is the Diffie-Hellman problem). Hence, A-TGDH 
provides the key authentication property. 
2) Key confirmation. As stated in the previous sub-section, a group can achieve 
different security levels of key confirmation determined by the subgroup size 
and the number of subgroups. The larger the subgroup size, the higher the 
degree of key confirmation that can be achieved. Also, if there are many 
subgroups and all of them intersect, we can obtain a higher level of key con-
firmation. 
3) Known-key security. It should be noted that the authenticated group key 
Kq consists of a secret random component equivalent to the group key of the 
non-authenticated TGDH. If E compromises this authenticated group key KQ, 
it cannot compute the past group keys as their corresponding secret random 
components are composed of the short-term secrets rui 's offered by different 
combinations of members, and doing so will require E to solve the Diffie-
Hellman problem. If any two past group keys refer to the same set of members, 
they are still different since each member Mi renews rui when it re-joins the 
group. 
4) Perfect forward secrecy. We want to prove that the secret keys of all non-leaf 
nodes provide perfect forward secrecy. We prove this property by induction 
on the levels of the tree which has the lowest level h. 
• Basis. Consider a node Vo at level h - 1 whose children are both leaf 
nodes associated with members Mn and 风2. Given the long-term 
private keys xmh and XMi2^  the adversary E cannot compute K^�= 
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Q,rMiirMi2+rMiiXMi2+fMi2XMii ^  siiice computmg without knowing 
rMii and r^ia is the Diffie-Hellman problem. 
• Induction hypothesis. Suppose that the keys of nodes 2v -{- 1 and 
2?; + 2 at some level /, where 0 < I < h — 1, give perfect forward secrecy. 
• Induction step. Consider the node v at level I — 1. Given only the 
long-term private keys, we cannot deduce K2V+1 and K2V+2 (by hypoth-
esis) .This implies Ky cannot be computed as it contains the component 
Thus, by induction, E cannot compute the secret keys of all non-leaf nodes 





We implemented a Linux-based C language application programming interface 
(API) library based on our interval-based algorithms. The API library, called 
the Secure Group Communication Library (SGCL) i，provides necessary soft-
ware components for developers to write secure group-oriented applications. 
To realize how to use the library, we built two demo applications: Chatter 
and Ganger. Chatter is a secure chat-room application which allows group 
members to communicate in plain messages that can be encrypted in real-
time. It supports both graphical and text modes. Ganger, on the other hand, 
aims to analyze the performance of the interval-based algorithms under real 
network settings. It can measure various performance metrics, such as the 
rekeying time, the number of exponentiations in the group key generation and 
the number of blinded key broadcasts, during a rekeying operation. Both ap-
plications reveal the strengths of using SGCL in the development of secure 
group-oriented applications for a peer-to-peer or mobile ad-hoc environment. 
This chapter covers the implementation issues regarding SGCL. In Sec-
tion 7.1, we first discuss two special member roles, leader and sponsor, and 
iFor details about SGCL as well as its source codes, please refer to: 
http://www.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/~cslui/ANSRlab/software/SGCL/index.htmL 
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explain their functions in facilitating the implementation. In Section 7.2, we 
present the system architecture of the library. In Section 7.3, we introduce 
the API functions and describe their properties. In Section 7.4, we give ex-
perimental results obtained from Gauger and study the performance of the 
interval-based algorithms under a real network environment. In Section 7.5, 
we introduce Chatter, a real-life application developed under SGCL, and sug-
gest other potential applications where SGCL fits their development needs. 
Finally, in Section 7.6, we discuss possible future extensions that enhance the 
security of the implementation. 
7.1 Leader and Sponsors 
The interval-based algorithms mentioned in Chapter 4 are built upon two im-
portant assumptions. First , all group members are synchronized to conduct 
rekeying operations periodically. Second, the sponsors know how to coordinate 
with each other so that they refrain from broadcasting the same blinded key 
more than once. In this section, we consider how to implement these assump-
tions. We begin with the introduction of a new role, called the leader, whose 
responsibility is to notify members to start a rekeying operation synchronously. 
We describe how a leader is elected to carry out its designated duties. Also, 
we discuss how sponsors are elected and coordinate with each other to mini-
mize the number of communication rounds required for broadcasting renewed 
blinded keys. At the end of this section, we summarize the working idea of a 
rekeying operation in the presence of the leader and sponsors. 
7.1.1 Leader 
The leader is the single member that is responsible for periodically notifying 
all group members to start a rekeying operation at regular rekeying intervals, 
for instance, via the broadcast of a rekeying message to all group members. 
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Such a role is necessary because of two reasons. First, the members may not 
share a global clock to synchronize on performing rekeying operations. Second, 
new members do not know the rekeying information including the present join 
and leave events as well as the existing key tree when they join the group. 
Although the leader can provide such rekeying information specifically for each 
new joining member, the processing load of the leader will become significant 
when the number of joining members is very high. To address both issues 
simultaneously, not only should the leader periodically broadcast a rekeying 
message to notify others to start a rekeying operation, but the leader also 
needs to include in the rekeying message the join and leave events as well as 
the structure of the current key tree that are to be manipulated in the rekeying 
operation. In order to achieve both purposes, we elect the member that stays 
in the communication group for the longest time to be the leader. 
A group member carries out leader election in two scenarios: (1) when 
the group member newly joins the group and (2) when the leader leaves the 
group. In either scenario, the group member first decides if it is the leader by 
checking if it stays the longest in the group. Assume that a group member 
recognizes the current membership when it joins the group. Then it can make 
the decision by checking if it is the first member in the group (for scenario 
l)or if all other members that are initially in the group have departed (for 
scenario 2). If it is the leader, it starts periodically broadcasting rekeying 
messages to notify others to start a rekeying operation. Otherwise, it waits 
for the first incoming rekeying message and concludes that the sender of the 
received rekeying message to be the leader. 
It is possible that a newly elected leader does not know the current key 
tree structure. This occurs when it has joined the group for some time and 
has not started any rekeying operation. In this case, the leader should include 
only an empty tree and the join events in the rekeying notification. The leave 
events, however, are not required as they do not take effect in an empty tree. 
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7.1.2 Sponsors 
Sponsors, as previously stated, refer to the group members that need to broad-
cast the blinded keys associated with the nodes in a key tree during a rekeying 
operation. To determine which blinded keys each sponsor should broadcast, we 
first set an implementation requirement: each member only holds the blinded 
keys along its co-path [11], which is defined as the sequence of nodes whose sib-
lings belong to the key path of the member. This implementation requirement 
is tighter than the assumption stated in our performance evaluation analysis 
in Chapter 5, that is, each group member holds all the blinded keys within the 
key tree. Thus, members can be benefited from less storage overhead for the 
blinded keys. As each member holds the blinded keys along its own co-path, 
the sponsors have to broadcast the blinded keys of the non-renewed nodes 
which are the children of the renewed nodes so that members can compute the 
secret keys of the renewed nodes. Broadcasting non-renewed blinded keys is 
essential for the new members which know nothing before they join the group 
as well as for the existing members whose co-path does not include the non-
renewed nodes prior to the rekeying operation (we will later illustrate how it 
helps the existing members with an example). Therefore, in our implementa-
tion, we appoint the sponsors to broadcast the blinded keys of two types of 
nodes: (1) all renewed nodes and (2) the non-renewed nodes whose parents 
are renewed nodes. 
In order that the group members only need to store the blinded keys in their 
co-paths, we refine the sponsor election criterion: in each rekeying interval, a 
member becomes a sponsor if it is the rightmost member of the subtree whose 
root is a non-renewed node but the parent of the root is a renewed node (note 
that if the member is the only member in the group, no sponsor is elected). 
It should be noted that all new members are elected to be sponsors based on 
this criterion. 
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After being elected, the sponsors have to decide the exact nodes whose 
corresponding blinded keys need to be broadcast. For efficiency, this decision-
making process, which we call sponsor coordination, should satisfy three prop-
erties: (1) self-computable, i.e., the sponsors need not communicate with other 
sponsors to make the decision, (2) lightweight, i.e., the process itself is simple, 
and (3) broadcast-efficient, i.e., the process leads to a minimum number of 
broadcasts of blinded keys. These properties ensure that sponsor coordination 
introduces little processing overhead to rekeying operations. 
Fig. 7.1 presents the pseudo-code of the sponsor coordination algorithm. 
To illustrate, consider Fig. 7.2, in which the key tree contains a number of 
renewed nodes (i.e., nodes 0, 1, 2, and 6). Based on our sponsor election 
criterion, Mi, M2, M5, M7, and Ms are elected to be sponsors. According 
to the algorithm in Fig. 7.1, member Mi broadcasts BK3, M2 broadcasts 
BK^^ and BKI, M5 broadcasts BK5, My broadcasts BKI^,, and Ms broadcasts 
BKu, BKQ, BK2, and BKQ. Furthermore, Fig. 7.2 illustrates the need of 
broadcasting the blinded keys of non-renewed nodes (i.e., nodes 3, 4, 5, 13, 
and 14) to existing members. For example, Mq and M-j do not hold the blinded 
key of node 14 if it is promoted from one of its child nodes since the node is 
not originally on their co-paths. Therefore, they have to obtain the blinded 
key from the sponsors. 
The sponsor coordination algorithm satisfies the three properties, i.e., self-
computable, lightweight and broadcast-efficient. It is self-computable because 
it does not involve any communication between sponsors to determine which 
blinded keys to be broadcast. Also, it is lightweight because it only requires 
a member to traverse its key path once. Finally, it is broadcast-efficient since 
it broadcasts the keys in a minimum number of rounds. To elaborate the 
last property, we consider Fig. 7.3 in which a renewed node Vp is the root of 
a subtree and has two child nodes, Vi and Vr, whose corresponding sponsors 
are M , � and M—), respectively. To decide which sponsor is to be selected 
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Sponsor—Coordination (T) 
/ * T is the updated key tree with a number of renewed nodes */ 
1. broadcast-list = NULL; 
2. if (sponsor) { /* responsibility of the sponsor */ 
3. k-node = leaf node of the member's key path; 
4. while {k-node is not T's root and k-node,s parent is not renewed) 
5. k-node = k-node's parent; 
6. insert k-node into broadcast Jist; 
7. while {k-node ！= T's root) { 
8. if (both k-node and kjnode^s sibling are not renewed or 
both kjnode and k-node,s sibling are renewed) { 
9. if (k-node is the right child) 
10. insert kjnode^s parent into broadcastJist\ 
11. else 
12. break the while loop; 
13. } else if {k-node is not renewed and kjnode,s sibling is renewed) { 
14. break the while loop; 
15. } else if {k-node is renewed and k-node's sibling is not renewed) { 
16. insert k-node,s parent into broadcastdist] 
17. } 
18. kjnode = kjnode,s parent; 
19. } / * end of while loop */ 
20. } / * end of if (sponsor) condition */ 
21. return broadcast-list; 
Figure 7.1: Pseudo-code of the sponsors coordination algorithm. 
J ® . . 
I l f j H Ml broadcasts BK3 
-^^ ''^ ^Vrrjv M2 broadcasts BK, and Biq 
© © © M, broadcasts BK, 
Mi(s) M, broadcasts BK13 
Mb broadcasts BKi„ BKj, BKj, and BK� 
M 3 M 4 M g M 7 ( S ) 
Figure 7.2: Example to illustrate the sponsor coordination algorithm in 
Fig. 7.1. 
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to broadcast the blinded key of Vp, we consider two cases. First, if only one 
child node is renewed, say vi is renewed but Vr is not, M,(s) can compute the 
secret key of Vp based on the unchanged blinded key of tv. This implies that 
M/(5) can broadcast the blinded keys of vi and Vp in one round. We therefore 
select M/(5) to broadcast the blinded key of Vp. Second, if both child nodes 
are renewed, i.e., vi and Vr are renewed nodes, both sponsors have to wait for 
the updated blinded keys of vi and Vr to compute the secret key of Vp. They 
need two rounds to broadcast the blinded key of Vp. We can therefore select 
any one sponsor, say the sponsor M八s) under the right child node, to take this 
responsibility. Combining two cases, we can apply similar arguments when 
vi is not a renewed node but Vr is and when both vi and Vr are not renewed 
nodes. Therefore, we conclude that the sponsor coordination algorithm is self-
computable, lightweight and broadcast-efficient and is adequate to be put into 
implementation. 
Ml ⑷ takes the c a n ^ t t h e ‘‘民(，） 
^ ^ responsibility ^ ^ responsibility 
/、、 / \ of broadcasting ,、、 ,、、 of broadcasting 
/ \ / \ B K ^ . / \ / \ B K^ We choose M^ (，” 
/ \ / \ / \ / \ 
/ \ / \ / \ / \ 
I • • IM ^ • ^ SM mm MM MM mm 4 ••••••• 一 一 謹 
(a) case 1: one child node is renewed, (b) case 2: both child nodes are renewed. 
Figure 7.3: Illustration of the broadcast-efficient property of the sponsor co-
ordination algorithm. 
7.1.3 Rekeying Operation 
We summarize how the leader and sponsors co-operate with all group members 
in conducting a rekeying operation. At regular rekeying intervals, the leader 
broadcasts a rekeying message to signal all group members to start a rekeying 
operation. Upon receiving the rekeying message, all group members update 
their key tree based on the agreed interval-based algorithm. They then elect 
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the corresponding sponsors, which broadcast renewed blinded keys to all group 
members. Consequently, every group member can compute the group key. 
7.2 System Architecture 
In this section, we provide an architectural overview of SGCL in three areas: 
(1) preliminary requirements for the library, (2) description of the software 
components, and (3) implementation considerations. 
7.2.1 System Preliminaries 
SGCL is implemented in C under Linux and requires two toolkits: Spread [22 
and OpenSSL [16]. Spread is a group communication model incorporated with 
reliable and ordered message delivery. It offers the view synchrony feature [7 
that ensures all messages from a communication group are delivered error-free 
and in sequence under the same membership view. In our implementation, 
we require that SGCL first connects to a Spread daemon, which maintains 
the reliable and ordered group communication, and then uses the exported 
API functions from Spread to send or receive packets through the daemon. 
OpenSSL, on the other hand, is a security toolkit offering a cryptography 
library and a certificate generation tool. We use it to implement cryptographic 
algorithms, such as Diffie-Hellman, as well as to create public-key certificates 
for the authentication of group members. Both toolkits are the pre-requisites 
of the SGCL development. 
We provide an optional member authorization feature, which is known as 
the SIGNATURE mode, to indicate that group members need to apply digital 
signatures to the packets to be sent. Prior to enabling the SIGNATURE 
mode, a group member should first obtain its public-key certificate and the 
corresponding long-term (or permanent) private key from a trusted certificate 
authority (CA). Then the member signs the packets with its long-term private 
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key before the packets are sent over the network. In our implementation, we 
select the X509 certificate standard [9] and the 1024-bit RSA [18] with SHA-
1 [15] signature scheme. If the transmission channel is authentic itself, the 
non-SIGNATURE mode can be used to eliminate the costs of the signature 
and verification operations. In most cases, however, the SIGNATURE mode 
should be activated. 
The implementation of SGCL contains several requirements. First, we 
require SGCL to support reliable and ordered message delivery in view syn-
chrony and to implement cryptographic protocols, and hence both Spread 
and OpenSSL should be pre-installed in a Linux system. Besides, the Diffie-
Hellman parameters, which are 1024-bit long in our implementation, should 
have been initialized and stored in the SGCL source directory before SGCL 
starts running. In addition, each group member should have a configuration 
file stating the unique member identifier, the membership details of all possi-
ble communication groups, and the connectivity information specifying which 
Spread daemon is to be connected. Furthermore, in the SIGNATURE mode, 
each group member should beforehand obtain its long-term private key and 
the certificates of other group members from a trusted CA. For consistency, a 
central repository can be set up to provide all necessary information related 
to the requirements. 
7.2.2 System Components 
SGCL is composed of four types of components: (1) engines, the entities which 
hold variables and methods for various functionalities, (2) queues, the linked-
list structures which store and dispatch packets in the first-in-first-out manner, 
(3) threads, the processes which handle all protocol operations, and (4) packets, 
the information which is exchanged between group members. Details of the 
components are summarized in Table 7.1. 
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Types Components Synopsis  
Engines certkey.engine It holds the long-term private key of the corresponding 
group member and the certificates of all group members. 
It also provides function calls for the signature and veri-
fication operations on the packets. It is used only if the 
SIGNATURE mode is activated.  
keytree.engine It holds the key tree. In every rekeying operation, it up-
dates the key tree based on the agreed interval-based algo-
rithm and returns the resultant renewed nodes and spon-
sors.  
leader-engine It stores the current leader in the group and performs 
leader election if necessary. It also holds the rekeying se-
quence number, which is used to identify the REKEY pack-
ets to be sent. 
member .engine It holds the current membership information, including the 
existing members in the group, as well as the joining and 
leaving members to be processed in the next rekeying in-
terval.  
packet .engine It creates packets according to the given parameters and 
sends packets to the network. 
sesskey_engine It represents the session key structure, which stores the 
Diffie-Hellman parameters, the secret and blinded keys 
along the key path of the corresponding member, as well 
as the group key.  
Queues message.queue It stores the MESSAGE packets to be retrieved by the 
application.  
packet-queue It stores all types of packets received from the group. 
rekey-queue It stores the rekeying signals, which are later transformed 
to the REKEY packets to be sent to the group. It is used 
by the leader only.  
Threads receive.thread It receives packets from the group and adds them to the 
packet queue.  
process-thread It retrieves packets from the packet_queue and processes 
them.  
rekey-send-thread It retrieves the REKEY packets from the rekey .queue and 
sends them to the group. It is used by the leader only, 
rekey-poll-thread It periodically inserts a rekeying signal to the rekey .queue 
so that the rekey_send_thread can retrieve the signal and 
send a REKEY packet. It is used by the leader only-
Packets JOIN packet It indicates a joining member.  
LEAVE packet It indicates a leaving member that gracefully leaves the 
group.  
DISCONNECT It indicates a leaving member that ungracefully leaves the 
packet group.  
REKEY packet It denotes the rekeying message signaling the group mem-
bers to start a rekeying operation. It stores the rekeying 
sequence number for identifying the current rekeying op-
eration, the rekeying algorithm to be used, the joining and 
leaving members, as well as the key tree that is to be up-
dated in the rekeying operation.  
BKEY packet It holds a sequence of blinded keys of part of the key tree 
nodes in a key path.  
MESSAGE packet It represents the application-level data to be processed by 
the application. It also includes the rekeying sequence 
number to specify which group key is used for encryption. 
Table 7.1: Description of components used in SGCL. 
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The SGCL packets are classified into two categories: membership packets 
and regular packets. Membership packets, including the JOIN, LEAVE, and 
DISCONNECT packets, are defined in the Spread specification [22]. They 
store the membership information essential for SGCL and the Spread daemons. 
Regular packets, however, are defined by SGCL. They are used by SGCL for 
rekeying operations and by underlying group-oriented applications for secure 
group communication. They include the REKEY, BKEY, and MESSAGE 
packets. Fig. 7.4 illustrates how SGCL defines the formats of the regular 
packets. 
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rekeying rekeying number nu^^er joining leaving , 
^ S e r a X g o / i t ^ .o^ns leaves t J e ^enO^erf n^ enO^ ers signature 
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(b) BKEY packet 
[4 encrypted — 
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rekeying 
sequence message message signature 
number length 
(c) MESSAGE packet 
Figure 7.4: Formats of the regular packets. 
SGCLs residing in the group-oriented applications operate and exchange 
packets with one another in order to achieve their functions. The general opera-
tions on the received packets can be summarized into several steps (assume that 
the SIGNATURE mode is activated): (1) The receivedJhread receives packets 
from the connected Spread daemon and adds them into the packet-queue. (2) 
The process.thread retrieves packets from the packet—queue if the queue is non-
empty. (3) The process.thread verifies the signatures attached to the packets. 
(4) Based on the packet types, the process.thread carries out the corresponding 
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operations with the member一engine, the leader—engine, the keytree—engine, the 
sesskey_engine, and the message-queue. (5) If the process .thread needs to send 
packets, it creates packets with the packet.engine. (6) The process—thread signs 
the packets with the certkey.engine. (7) Finally, the process-thread sends the 
packets via the packet.engine to the connected Spread daemon and then to the 
communication group. Fig. 7.5 illustrates the general idea of the operations 
on the received packets. 
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Figure 7.5: Overview of general operations on received packets. 
Let us take a more detailed look into the operations on how the pro-
cess-thread responds to the received packets according to different packet types: 
• Operations on a received JOIN/LEAVE/DISCONNECT packet: 
The process-thread inserts the joining or leaving member into the mem-
ber-engine. Also, depending on the membership events, it performs 
leader election, and creates the leader-specific components if the member 
becomes the leader (the operations of the leader-specific components are 
described later in this subsection). It should be noted that the operations 
on the LEAVE and DISCONNECT packets are both identical. 
• Operations on a received REKEY packet: The process.thread first 
Chapter 7 Implementation and Applications 62 
retrieves the rekeying information including the rekeying sequence num-
ber (the identifier of a REKEY packet and hence a rekeying operation), 
the joining and leaving members, as well as the key tree, from the received 
REKEY packet. The process-thread then starts the rekeying operation, 
which consists of (1) specifying the leader's identity in the leader—engine., 
(2) synchronizing the joining and leaving members with those in the 
member-engine., (3) updating the key tree in the keytree一engine based on 
the selected interval-based algorithm; and (4) updating the secret and 
blinded keys of the key path in the sesskey.engine and broadcasting any 
blinded keys if the group member becomes a sponsor. 
• Operations on a received B K E Y packet: The process-thread obtains 
the blinded keys from the packet, which is composed of a sequence of 
blinded keys of some key tree nodes in a key path. If the blinded keys 
help the group key generation, the process-thread computes the secret 
keys along the key path, which is maintained by the sesskey.engine. 
Besides, if the group member is a sponsor and the sesskey.engine contains 
the new blinded keys to be broadcast, the process-thread will broadcast 
a BKEY packet consisting of the blinded keys. 
• Operations on a received MESSAGE packet: The processJhread 
inserts the MESSAGE packet, which contains the application-level mes-
sages, into the message一queue. The enqueued packets will later be re-
trieved by the SGCL.recv() function (described in the next subsection) 
and processed by the application. 
If a group member is elected to be leader, the process-thread will cre-
ate the leader-specific components, composed of the rekey-polLthread, the 
rekey-sendJhread, and the rekey_queue. To send a rekeying message to the 
group, the leader performs the following procedures: (1) The rekey-polLthread 
periodically issues a rekeying signal (the indicator of performing a rekeying 
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operation) into the rekey-queue and notifies the rekeysend-thread to send 
REKEY packets. The rekeying signal also specifies the interval-based algo-
rithm to be performed. (2) When the rekeysendJhread is notified, it removes 
the rekeying signal from the rekey—queue. (3) The rekeysendJhread gathers 
the rekeying sequence number from the leader.engine, the joining and leav-
ing members from the member一engine, and the existing key tree from the 
keytree—engine. (4) Then the rekey一send—thread constructs the REKEY packet 
based on the gathered details. (5) The rekeysendJhread signs the REKEY 
packet with the certkey.engine. (6) Finally, the rekey_send-thread sends the 
packet over the network. 
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Figure 7.6: Overview of leader-specific components and their relationships with 
other components. 
To ensure that the REKEY packet contains the updated information, the 
rekeysendJhread should retrieve the next rekeying signal from the rekey—queue 
and sends its corresponding REKEY packet only after all engines are updated 
regarding the previous rekeying operation. Fig. 7.6 illustrates the leader-
specific components and their interactions with other components. 
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7.2.3 Implementation Considerations 
In this subsection, we consider several implementation issues and suggest their 
possible solutions. These considerations are described as follows: 
• Message encryption/decryption: Application-level messages are em-
bedded in the MESSAGE packets, which are encrypted before being sent. 
The message encryption and decryption are based on Triple-DES-CBC 
19]. In most cases, the latest group key is used for data encryption. 
However, if communication happens during a rekeying operation, the 
group key formed in the previous rekeying interval is used instead. If the 
SIGNATURE mode is activated, the approach "signature before encryp-
tion" should be adopted [19], as shown in Fig. 7.4. 
• Key confirmation: Key confirmation [2] refers that every member as-
sures other members actually obtain the group key. Providing complete 
key confirmation incurs high communication cost since it requires all 
members to demonstrate their knowledge of the group key to other mem-
bers. In our implementation, we adopt a weaker key confirmation ap-
proach, in which we designate a sponsor to broadcast the blinded group 
key (i.e., the blinded key of the root of the key tree) which lets other 
members verify if their computed blinded group key is identical to the 
one they receive. 
• Robustness: It is possible that group members may leave the group or 
encounter system failures during a rekeying operation. If one of those 
members is a sponsor and fails to broadcast the necessary blinded keys, 
the group key cannot be computed. To resolve the problem, our imple-
mentation requires the leader to broadcast a rekeying message for a new 
rekeying operation if a sponsor leaves the group and the blinded group 
key for the current rekeying operation is not received, that is, the group 
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key is not yet confirmed. The new rekeying operation should reflect the 
leave event of the departed sponsor. It should be noted that the re-
newed nodes that are supposed to be broadcast by the departed sponsor 
in the previous rekeying operation remain renewed in the new one since 
they are on the key path of the departed sponsor and the blinded keys 
of those renewed nodes will be broadcast by other sponsors. This so-
called self-stabilizing property, which is discussed in [11], is realized in 
our implementation. 
• Defense mechanisms: We identify several possible adversary attacks 
that can happen in our implementation. They include: (1) joining the 
communication group without valid certificates; (2) corrupting signed 
messages; (3) pretending to be the leader; and (4) disrupting rekeying 
operations via various means, say, via broadcasting forged blinded keys 
or replaying signed blinded keys from previous rekeying operations. Our 
implementation combats these attacks respectively through the follow-
ing: (1) checking the existence of the certificate of every joining member; 
(2) verifying signatures; (3) checking if the claimed leader joins the group 
later than some members; and (4) validating the group key via key con-
firmation. If attacks do exist, warning messages are displayed, and if 
attacks are (2) to (4), the system aborts. 
7.3 SGCL API 
SGCL comprises a number of API functions that enables developers to imple-
ment the interval-based algorithms in their secure group-oriented applications. 
The operations of the API functions rely on an SGCL session object, which 
holds all the components constituting the system architecture of SGCL. Details 
of the API functions are described in Table 7.2. 
Fig. 7.7 presents the flowchart of using the SGCL API in a typical secure 
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Functions Synopsis Return values 
SGCLJnit() It creates and initializes an SGCL ses- An initialized 
sion object for subsequent SGCL opera- session object 
tions. on success and 
NULL on failure 
SGCL_set_passwd() It sets the password, critical for access- 1 on success and 
ing the long-term private key, inside the 0 on failure 
SGCL session object. It takes no effect 
if member authentication (i.e., the SIG-
NATURE mode) is disabled.  
SGCL_join() It connects to the Spread daemon 1 on success and 
and joins the specified communication 0 on failure 
group. It also initializes all components 
inside the SGCL session object.  
SGCL_send() It encrypts the application messages 1 on success and 
with the current group key and sends 0 on failure 
them to the communication group. 
SGCL_recv() It receives the application messages 1 on success and 
from the communication group and de- 0 on failure 
crypts them with the current group key. 
SGCL_read_membership() It reports the current group member- 1 on success and 
ship status including the existing mem- 0 on failure 
bers, the joining members and the leav-
ing members. 
SGCLJeave() It disables any operations and frees the 1 on success and 
resources of all components inside the 0 on failure 
SGCL session object. It then leaves the 
communication group and disconnects 
from the Spread daemon.  
SGCL_destroy() It destroys the SGCL session object and 1 on success and 
free its resources. 0 on failure  
Table 7.2: Description of the SGCL API functions. 
group-oriented application. The flow is described as follows: (1) the applica-
tion creates and initializes an SGCL session object with SGCL-init()', (2) it 
opens the file of the long-term private key, which should be password-protected, 
with SGCL-setjpasswd(), provided that member authentication is enabled; (3) 
it requests to join the specified communication group with SGCL.join(); (4) 
it implements its application protocols with SGCL.send(), SGCL.recv() and 
SGCL-read-membership() in order to send messages, receive messages, and 
read membership status, respectively; (5) it leaves the group with SGCLJeave(); 
and (6) it either joins another or the same group with SGCL一join(), or destroys 
the SGCL session object with SGCL.destroy() and ends. 





I SGCL一 send() 
] SGCL一 recv() 
I SGCL_read_membership() 
I (for application protocols) 
SGCLJeaveO 
SGCL_destroy() 
Figure 7.7: Flowchart of using the SGCL API. 
7.4 Experiments 
Motivated by the performance study in Chapter 5, we used Ganger, a per-
formance testing tool developed with SGCL, to evaluate the performance of 
different interval-based algorithms under real network settings. In this section, 
we investigate two experiments, in which we are interested in the following 
metrics for a particular rekeying operation: 
• Rekeying time: It measures the duration from starting a rekeying oper-
ation till confirming the correctness of the updated group key. 
• Number of exponentiations: It measures the computation cost involving 
the exponentiation operations in the secret key and blinded key compu-
tations. 
• Number of broadcast blinded keys: It measures the communication cost 
involving the number of blinded keys that are broadcast during a rekeying 
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operation. 
• Number of broadcast packets of blinded keys: It measures the communi-
cation cost involving the number of broadcast packets of blinded keys 
during a rekeying operation. If the SIGNATURE mode is used, it also 
accounts for the computation cost in signing or verifying the broadcast 
packets. This metric is equivalent to the number of BKEY packets de-
fined in Table 7.1. It should be noted each packet can contain more than 
one blinded key if they can be computed in one round. 
The experiments were carried out under the following configurations. We 
fixed the group population to 40 Ganger applications, each of which corre-
sponds to a group member that stays either inside or outside the same commu-
nication group for some time lengths. We assigned the group members evenly 
to eight Pentium 4/2.5GHz machines running Linux, that is, each machine had 
five Gauger applications installed. All eight machines were interconnected in 
a single local area network, so they were reachable from each other through 
broadcasts. A Spread daemon with configured parameters was running in 
each machine, and each Gauger application connected to the Spread daemon 
in the same local machine when it started execution. These configurations are 
assumed throughout the experiments. 
The time lengths for which a Gauger application stays inside and outside 
the group are respectively given by Tin + c and Tout + c, where T^ and Tout are 
exponentially distributed and c denotes a constant period. The reason that 
we add a constant to the time lengths is to avoid a particular member joining 
or leaving the communication group abruptly and hence we can guarantee a 
sufficient amount of time for the resources to be re-allocated between member-
ship events. For accuracy, we pre-generated pattern files stating the occurrence 
times of join and leave events based on the distributions with various exponen-
tial averages of Tin and Tout, and then examined the performance of different 
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algorithms for a particular set of average parameters using the same pattern 
file. 
The experiments assume several constant parameters. We let the rekeying 
interval, the regular period of performing rekeying operations, be 15 seconds, 
and the constant c, the minimum interval between two membership events for 
a group member, be 10 seconds. With the pre-generated pattern files, we ran 
the experiments for two hours, and then collected the recorded metrics for 
analysis. 
Experiment 1: (Average analysis at different fixed T—,s) This 
experiment evaluates the performance metrics of Rebuild, Batch and Queue-
batch. We fixed Tout to be 30, 60, and 90 seconds, as well as varied T^ when 
conducting the experiment. Similar to the performance evaluation experiments 
in Chapter 5, the motivation of adopting fixed ToutS is to control the rate that 
members join the communication group. After the experiment, we averaged 
the metrics over the number of existing members in the group at each rekeying 
interval. 
The results are presented in Fig. 7.8. Among all Tout's, we note that the 
metric costs are the largest at Tout = 30 seconds. It is because with a smaller 
Tout members tend to stay longer in the group and more members participate 
in a rekeying operation. This implies the key tree is bigger and therefore 
more operations are required to generate a group key. Besides, we observe 
Queue-batch outperforms the other two algorithms in all metrics. This shows 
the performance gain of Queue-batch in its dispersing the rekeying workload 
throughout the rekeying interval. 
Experiment 2: (Average analysis of Batch and Queue-batch at 
different levels of membership dynamics) This experiment examines how 
the performance of the interval-based algorithms varies with respect to the 
frequencies of the join and leave occurrences. We only considered Batch and 
Queue-batch since they both demonstrate better performance than Rebuild. 
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Here, we set Tin equal to Tout, and changed the pair of T^ and Tout from 
30 seconds to 90 seconds. Then we recorded the number of exponentiations, 
the number of broadcast blinded keys and the number of broadcast packets 
of blinded keys after the experiment. We did not consider the rekeying time 
since it is less stable and more machine-dependent compared to the other two 
metrics and results in a high deviation. Finally, we averaged the recorded 
metrics over the group size in each rekeying interval. 
Fig. 7.9 illustrates the results. It shows that Queue-batch outperforms more 
than Batch when Tin and Tout are smaller. In other words, Queue-batch is more 
superior than Batch when the group is more dynamic. This conforms to the 
results presented in Chapter 5, which stated that the superior performance of 
Queue-batch becomes more obvious when the join and leave events occur more 
frequently and explained the reasons behind. 
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Figure 7.9: Average analysis at different levels of membership dynamics. 
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7.5 Applications 
To demonstrate how SGCL can be realized in real-life applications, we deployed 
SGCL on a secure chat-room application called Chatter. Chatters allow indi-
viduals to participate in a communication group and to send communication 
messages securely to group members. The messages being sent undergo encryp-
tion with the group key and hence they are confidential against eavesdroppers 
when being transmitted over the network. 
We implemented Chatter in both graphical and text modes, and its screen-
shots are illustrated in Figs. 7.10 and 7.11. The graphical mode lets users 
enjoy a colorful interface, but its implementation requires the presence of the 
X Window system in Linux. The text mode, therefore, is built to provide 
users with a text-based command console without the need of any graphical-
compliant platform. Both interface modes are compatible and can be used 
together within the same communication group. 
Apart from the chat-room applications, we envision that SGCL is feasible 
in a number of potential applications consisting of: 
• Audio/video conferencing systems: Business parties may hold au-
dio /video conferences with their laptop or desktop computers. The con-
ferencing systems usually transfer massive streaming data among which 
there can be confidential business information. They can hence use SGCL 
to agree upon a secret group key to encrypt the streaming data. 
• File sharing tools: File sharing is prevalent in peer-to-peer networks. 
Most shared files usually do not involve sensitive information, but some 
do. Therefore, if a file sharing application intends to distribute a private 
file to a group of users, SGCL will help protect the file data. 
• Router communication paradigms: Routers may form a commu-
nication group in some situations. For instance, in defending against 
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Figure 7.10: Illustration of Chatter in the graphical mode. 
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Enter your password： 
UID: Patrick 
SPREAD IP： 127,0.0.1 
SPREAD PORT; 4803 
CHATTER>join mygroup 
Status： You have successfully joined a group, 
CHATTER>member 




ICHATTER>ras9 How are you doing? 
CHATTER>Hessa9e received (Patrick at 10:47)： How are you doing? 
CHATTER>Messa9e received (dave at 10:47): I'm fine. 
CHATTER〉 = = = = = = = = = = = 1 
Figure 7.11: Illustration of Chatter in the text mode. 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, routers may exchange in-
formation in order to pinpoint the location of attackers. Such exchanged 
information should be inaccessible to the attackers so that the detection 
succeeds. In this case, the exchanged information can be protected with 
SGCL. 
• Network games in strategy planning: In network games, players 
may co-operate with each other in deciding the winning strategies over 
other competitors. This type of interaction involves numerous message 
exchanges. Thus, the games can use SGCL to encrypt the messages 
against any cheating attacks, such as eavesdropping and modification of 
the transmitted game data. 
In short, SGCL implements the interval-based algorithms that achieves 
group key agreement without any centralized key server, and hence is adequate 
for any secure group-oriented applications in decentralized environments such 
as peer-to-peer networks or mobile ad hoc networks. 
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7.6 Future Extensions 
Several enhancements can be made to enrich the current implementation. 
First, it is likely that we can achieve a higher degree of identity protection 
through A-TGDH (Authenticated Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman), the au-
thenticated key agreement protocol presented in Chapter 6, by incorporating 
the long-term private key components of the group members into the group 
key. Second, our implementation aborts the operations when certain attacks 
are encountered. This approach, however, is not always desirable as it results 
in denial-of-service. Better recovery procedures are therefore needed to make 
the implementation more robust. Third, the current membership information 
is not protected in its transmission. In other words, when the Spread daemon 
reports the membership status to group members or other participating Spread 
daemons, the information is sent in plain and thus allows outsiders to recog-
nize which are the existing members in a communication group. Although the 
exposure of such information may not be a critical security concern, it would 
be better to encrypt all data transmitted among Spread daemons and group 
members. Finally, we only explore the periodic interval-based approach for 
rekeying operations. Instead, we can switch to the threshold-based approach, 
for example, rekeying starts when the number of join and leave events exceeds 
a certain limit. Both approaches, in fact, can be incorporated into the system. 
Recall that a rekeying operation is sparked when the group leader broadcasts 
a rekeying message (represented as a REKEY packet in our implementation). 
We can define a set of policy rules stating when rekeying should start, such 
as after a fixed period or after the number of membership events reaches a 
threshold, and require the leader to issue the rekeying message to notify oth-
ers to start rekeying when these conditions are met. We expect that putting 
these extensions into the implementation can make it more feasible for being 
used in practice. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Future 
Directions 
This chapter provides the conclusions for this dissertation and suggests some 
future directions for this research. 
8.1 Conclusions 
We considered several distributed collaborative key agreement protocols for 
dynamic peer groups. The key agreement setting is carried out such that 
there is no centralized key server maintaining and distributing the group key. 
We show that one can use the TGDH protocol to achieve such distributed and 
collaborative key agreement. To reduce the rekeying complexity, we proposed 
to use the interval-based distributed rekeying algorithms that allow us to group 
multiple join and leave requests and to process them at the same time. In 
particular, we showed that the Queue-batch algorithm can significantly reduce 
both computation and communication costs. This reduction can lead to a 
more efficient way to manage secure group communication. We also proposed 
an authenticated group key agreement scheme which offers protection against 
various attacks, as well as implemented SGCL to study the interval-based 
algorithms in a real network environment and to support the development of 
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secure group-oriented applications for dynamic peer groups. 
8.2 Future Directions 
We explore future directions that may enrich this research. We focus on two 
areas: constructing a hybrid key tree with the physical and logical properties 
and extending the implementation. 
8.2.1 Construction of a Hybrid Key Tree with the Phys-
ical and Logical Properties 
The key tree approach has been adopted by a number of centralized and de-
centralized group key management schemes [26, 27, 17, 20，28，11, 14’ 12, 29], 
as well as our interval-based algorithms. Its intuitive idea is to maintain a key 
tree hierarchy for a number of keys that finally constitute the group key. Dur-
ing a rekeying operation, the key tree and hence the group key are updated in 
response to the dynamic join and leave events. The major advantage of using 
this approach is that the key tree itself is logical, and hence the rekeying oper-
ations do not rely on the support of intermediate routers and network devices 
while attaining a good rekeying efficiency. 
In updating the key tree, all the proposed tree-based group key manage-
ment schemes emphasize to preserve a balanced tree, yet do not take account 
of the underlying physical proximity. However, the rekeying performance may 
not be optimized in some circumstances. Consider Fig. 8.1 (a), which illus-
trates a wide area network (WAN)-based communication group dispersed in 
four different local area networks (LANs). Those LANs are assumed to be 
interconnected with low-bandwidth links. According to the classic rekeying 
approach, members can be located randomly under the key tree as long as 
the key tree is balanced. This implies that the sponsors are distributed in 
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different local area networks and have to exchange new blinded keys across 
the low-bandwidth links in each round. We therefore expect that those links 
will suffer heavy traffic load caused by a lot of blinded key transfers. 
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Figure 8.1: Approaches of updating the key tree. 
To remedy the overhead in the low-bandwidth links, we change the arrange-
ment of the key tree as follows. A communication group first divides itself into 
clusters, each of which is composed of members that are close together or that 
are interconnected with high-bandwidth links. In each cluster, the members 
can use a classic rekeying algorithm to form a subtree, as balanced as possible, 
and agree upon a subgroup key. The members then merge the subtree to form 
the key tree and finally use the subgroup keys to compute the resultant group 
key. When a new member joins the group, its associated leaf node should be 
put under the subtree of the cluster to which it belongs. Fig. 8.1(b) illustrates 
the new approach. In the figure, members in the same LAN are grouped to 
form a cluster. In other words, there are four clusters, each of which cor-
responds to a single LAN. The members in the same LAN first construct a 
subtree and obtain the subgroup key based on a classic rekeying algorithm. 
They they create the key tree with other clusters and obtain the final group 
key. When a new member, say joins the group, it should be put under 
the subtree in LAN A and the rekeying operation is then performed. With the 
new approach, we cut the loads of the low-bandwidth links by deferring the 
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blinded key transfers over them to the last few rounds. Hence we can achieve a 
better rekeying performance by combining the physical and logical properties 
in the update of the key tree. 
To effectively realize both physical and logical properties, we need to re-
solve several questions: (1) "How many clusters are needed?" ； (2) "How many 
members a cluster should contain?" ； (3) "Can we define clusters with formal 
models?" ； and (4) "What network environments are adequate for this hybrid 
rekeying approach?". These questions can help derive a thorough solution 
regarding this problem. 
8.2.2 Extended Implementation 
In terms of implementation, we expect that there is room for expansion. In 
Section 7.6, we drafted a number of extensions aiming to improve the security 
of the implementation. Besides, it would be interesting to study the imple-
mentation performance in a different network environment, such as a wireless 
ad hoc network where the resources are constrained in the bandwidth of com-
munication links and the computation power of mobile handsets. With the 
implementation extensions, we can have a better comprehension about the 
distributed and collaborative group key agreement protocols for a dynamic 
peer group. 
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